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Abstract
One of the most famous, and most derided, arguments against the morality of abortion is the
argument from potential, which maintains that the fetus' potential to become a person and enjoy
the valuable life common to persons, entails that its destruction is prima facie morally impermissible.
In this paper, I will revisit and offer a defense of the argument from potential.
First, I will criticize the classical arguments proffered against the importance of fetal potential,
specifically the arguments put forth by philosophers Peter Singer and David Boonin, by carefully
unpacking the claims made in these arguments and illustrating why they are flawed.
Secondly, I will maintain that fetal potential is morally relevant when it comes to the morality of
abortion, but that it must be accorded a proper place in the argument. This proper place, however,
cannot be found until we first answer a very important and complex question: we must first address
the issue of personal identity, and when the fetus becomes the type of being who is relevantly
identical to a future person. I will illustrate why the question of fetal potential can only be
meaningfully addressed after we have first answered the question of personal identity and how it
relates to the human fetus.
Background
One of the most famous, and concurrently one of the
most derided, arguments against the morality of abortion
is the argument from fetal potential. This argument main-
tains that the fetus' potential to become a human person
and enjoy the valuable life common to human persons
entails that its destruction is prima facie morally impermis-
sible. It is important to note here that the term "person" is
used here in the strict philosophical sense; it is not meant
to denote any and all human beings, as it is normatively
used, but rather any being, human or nonhuman, that has
the mental capacity to be rational, self-conscious, autono-
mous, and a moral agent.
One of the reasons that this argument is so interesting is
that it is simultaneously ridiculed by some philosophers,
and lauded by others. Many who reject the argument do
so because they believe that it results in what is often
called the "sperm/ova problem": if we regard the potential
of a fetus to become a person as a morally relevant reason
against killing it, we must also hold the same of human
gametes, who also possess the potential to become per-
sons. For example, Bonnie Steinbock writes:
The strongest objection to the argument from poten-
tial is that it seems to make contraception, and even
abstinence, prima facie morally wrong. If the objec-
tion to abortion is that it deprives the zygote of a
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same complaint be made of contraceptive techniques
that ill sperm, or prevent fertilization? Why don't gam-
etes have "a future like ours"?... so if abortion is seri-
ously wrong because it kills a potential person, then
the use of conceptive is equally seriously wrong. In
using spermicide, one commits mass murder! [1]
L.W. Sumner makes a similar accusation:
... as far as the potentiality argument is concerned,
abortion and contraception are both wrong, both
equally wrong, and both wrong for precisely the same
reason [2].
Conversely, other philosophers hold that the argument
from potential is significant because it is the only thing
that explains the stewardship that adult human beings
have in regard to human neonates. Newborn infants lack
the psychological maturity to possess goals, aims, beliefs,
or purposes. This does not, however, exclude them from
the moral community. The reason why it does not is
because we realize that infants have the potential to
develop these conscious goods, and it is this potential
that, as Jim Stone argues, grounds the infant's interest in
growing up and realizing that potential [3]. Every single
semester that I teach the issue of abortion in class, I put up
a picture of two cells that look striking similar, almost
identical. I then reveal to my students that one is a skin
cell, and the other is a fertilized egg at the zygotic stage of
development. "Do they have the same moral status"?, I
ask them. When I scratch my arm and kill skin cells, is my
action as morally problematic as abortion? My students
always answer that the two cell types are morally different;
that the zygote is of a different status than my skin cells.
In defense of this distinction, they always give the same
reason: the zygote, if implanted into a uterus, has the
potential to become a baby who will then become a per-
son, whereas my skin cells do not. Since the vast majority
of my students, in my seven years of teaching, share this
intuition, I think that it is an intuition that is worthy of
being explored rather than cavalierly dismissed.
The term "potential" as it is being used in this essay is not
meant to describe mere possibility, i.e., X has the potential
to achieve Y does not just mean X may possibly attain Y.
If that were what was meant by potential, it would be very
weak indeed. A seed would not just be a potential flower
or plant, but also a potential food or a potential material
for an art project. A kitten would not just be a potential
cat, but also a potential delicacy at some restaurant, or a
potential fur coat. Rather, potential, in the way I am using
it here and the way I assume most advocates of the argu-
ment from potential use the concept, refers to, as Stephen
Buckle puts it, a certain being's "potency... the power it
[actually] possesses in virtue of its specific constitution"
[4] to grow into a being of a certain sort. That is, X is a
potential Y if X possesses the power to become Y; that X
will become Y, if it lives long enough. In this way, a cater-
pillar is a potential butterfly (since it possesses the power
to become a butterfly; it will become a butterfly if it lives
long enough), as a child is a potential adult. A fetus is a
potential person in this way; a fetus may not just possibly
become a person, it will become a person, if its growth is
unfettered and if it lives long enough.
With this introduction in mind, I can proceed to stating
the goal of this paper, which is two-fold. First, I will criti-
cize the classical arguments proffered against the impor-
tance of fetal potential, specifically the arguments put
forth by philosophers Peter Singer and David Boonin, by
carefully unpacking the claims made in these arguments
and illustrating why they are flawed. I will argue that both
Singer and Boonin assume that possessing actual person-
hood is a necessary condition in order to be accorded the
right to life, but it seems that this is the very issue at hand
and the very claim that those who argue in favor of the
importance of fetal potential will challenge and subse-
quently reject.
Secondly, I will maintain that a fetus' potential can be sali-
ent when it comes to the morality of abortion, but that its
proper place cannot be found until we first address a very
important and difficult issue: the question concerning
personal identity, and when the fetus becomes the type of
being who is relevantly identical to a future person. I will
illustrate how we cannot begin to tackle this perennial
applied ethics issue without first addressing the metaphys-
ical quagmire of personal identity, for where one stands
on this metaphysical issue may greatly influence when
one thinks potential begins to matter when it comes to the
human fetus.
Against Singer and Boonin
What is wrong with the classical objections concerning 
fetal potential?
John T. Noonan uses a version of the argument from
potential in order to provide one of many reasons why he
deems abortion morally impermissible.
If a fetus is destroyed, one destroys a being already
possessed of the genetic code, organs, and sensitivity
to pain, and one which had an eighty percent chance
of developing further into a baby outside the womb
who, in time, would reason... once conceived, the
being was recognized as man because he had man's
potential [5].
For many philosophers, the argument from potential is
considered invalid, either because the argument rests on aPage 2 of 16
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debate. Individuals who argue in the first manner main-
tain that the logical mistake comes in asking us to treat a
potential X as if it is an actual X. Particularly, it asks us to
treat a potential person, the fetus, as if it were already an
actual person. However, the argument goes, how we treat
a being ought to depend on its actually possessed proper-
ties, rather than on its potentially possessed ones. For those
who would counter that an exception should be made for
the life of the fetus because the right to life is somehow
different and deserves to be extended to the fetus in virtue
of its potential to become a person, the second objection
applies. That is, given that potential Xs are never treated as
actual Xs simply in virtue of their potential, there seems to
be absolutely no reason to extend this special treatment to
fetuses. As Paul Bassen writes: " [n]owhere outside the
abortion debate itself is there a precedent for supposing
that future prospects can create a present sake [6]." There-
fore, although a standard human fetus possesses the
potential to become a person and hence enjoy the kind of
life typical to persons, this alone, the argument goes, does
not create an obligation to protect the fetus as it exists cur-
rently.
It seems to me that those who argue against the moral rel-
evance of fetal potential (whom I will call "anti-potential-
ists") do not really comprehend the role that their
opponents give to the potential of the fetus. The fault of
this misapprehension lies on both sides, for those who
argue that the potential of the fetus does play a significant
role when determining the morality of abortion (whom I
will call "pro-potentialists") have not adequately clarified
their position in light of the objections offered by anti-
potentialists. It is my objective in this section to detail the
anti-potentialists' concerns and propose some methods
that the pro-potentialist can use in order to respond to
these concerns.
Let us begin by outlining the standard argument against
the moral permissibility of abortion given the purported
moral relevancy of the fetus' potential.
Premise 1: All innocent persons have a moral right to life.
Premise 2: Since all innocent persons have a moral right
to life, all potential innocent persons also have a moral
right to life.
Premise 3: The human fetus is a potential innocent per-
son.
Conclusion: The human fetus has a moral right to life.
For both anti- and pro-potentialists, premise one is
uncontroversial, and premise three ought not to pose
much of a problem either, since it is a biological claim
rather than a moral one. Indeed, the standard human
fetus, barring any unfortunate accident, will grow into an
infant, child, and adult, and therefore will enjoy the life of
a standard human person. The controversy, then, seems to
lie in premise two: why is it true that the right to life of an
innocent person ought to extend also to the fetus given its
potential? How should premise two be defended?
Peter Singer presents a scathing objection to premise two
because he does not think that an adequate defense of it is
possible.
There is no rule that says that a potential X has the
same value as an [actual] X, or has all the rights of an
X. There are many examples that show just the con-
trary. Pulling out a sprouting acorn is not the same as
cutting down a venerable oak. To drop a live chicken
into a pot of boiling water would be much worse than
doing the same to an egg. Prince Charles is the poten-
tial King of England, but he does not now have the
rights of a king [7].
David Boonin offers the following analysis, and subse-
quent rejection of, premise two.
Perhaps the simplest argument from potentiality is
one that rests on a general assumption of the follow-
ing sort. Potential possession of a right entails actual
possession of a right... [the argument's] major assump-
tion rests on a logical error. It is certainly not true of
properties in general that if a given individual poten-
tially has a given property, then the individual already
has this property [8].
As anti-potentialists regard it, any argument from poten-
tial commits the error of maintaining that for all things X,
if X is a potential Y, then X ought to already be treated as
an actual Y. Particularly, when it comes to the role of
potential in the abortion debate, the argument com-
mences with the uncontroversial premise that all innocent
persons have a right to life. From this, the argument
implicitly accepts the generalization expressed above.
Since all actual innocent persons have a right to life (as
premise one asserts), and since any potential person
ought to be treated as an actual person (as entailed by the
above generalization), a potential person also ought to
possess the right to life. The fetus can certainly be substi-
tuted for the X variable, since a fetus is a potential person.
Thus, the fetus also has a right to life.
At first blush, it does seem that Singer and Boonin present
valid criticisms of this argument: it does not seem to fol-
low that potential Xs are to be treated like actual Xs merely
in virtue of their potential. Indeed, there are various exam-Page 3 of 16
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Prince William are both potential Kings of England.
Notice that they are not just possibly the future Kings of
England (like perhaps Prince Harry is); if they live long
enough, both Charles and William will, respectively,
become the King of England in the future. However, this
potential does not accord them the rights of kings while
they are princes. Medical students, although potential
physicians, do not possess the same rights (or responsibil-
ities) as actual physicians do [9]. Children, although
potential adults, do not possess the same rights as actual
adults, for example, they cannot vote or drink alcoholic
beverages. As these examples illustrate, beings are treated
in accordance with their actually possessed properties, not
their potentially possessed ones.
In light of this, the pro-potentialist seems to be making a
mistake in logical reasoning, or at the very least asking us
to make an exception when it comes to the human fetus
without justification. But, as Singer puts it: "We should
not accept that a potential person should have the rights
of a person, unless we can be given some specific reason
why this should hold in this particular case [10]." Singer
argues that, when it comes to the right to life, it is essential
that an individual be able perceive of herself as a continu-
ing entity existing over time so that she may be capable of
desiring continued existence. In order to possess this con-
ceptual capacity, the being in question must be a person.
[T]he desire relevant to possessing a right to life is the
desire to continue existing as a distinct entity. But only
a being who is capable of conceiving herself as a dis-
tinct entity existing over time – that is, only a person –
could have this desire. Therefore only a person could
have a right to life... an individual cannot at a given
time – say, now – have a right to continued existence
unless the individual is of a kind such that it can now
be in its interest that it continue to exist... since no
fetus is a person, no fetus has the same claim to life as
a person... [11]
Since the fetus never meets this necessary requirement, no
fetus can ever be classified as a person, and its mere poten-
tial to one day be one does not ground a right to life now:
"if [the requirements for personhood] are the grounds for
not killing persons, the mere potential for becoming a
person does not count against killing [12]."
It is in Singer's response that we can begin to see a possible
line of defense for the pro-potentialist. Notice premise
two again.
Premise 2: Since all innocent persons have a moral right
to life, all potential innocent persons also have a moral
right to life.
Now, also take notice of the different examples that are
given by both Singer and Boonin in order to challenge the
truth of premise two: Charles and William, although
potential kings, do not have the same rights as an actual
king. Medical students, although potential physicians, do
not have the same rights as actual physicians. Children,
although potential adults, do not have all the same rights
as actual adults, for example they lack the right to vote or
drink alcoholic beverages (this is my own example,
although Boonin makes the broad argument that there are
some rights and responsibilities that adults have that chil-
dren do not). Thus, in order to be consistent with these
examples, fetuses, although potential persons, are not per-
sons yet and so ought not to be accorded a right to life.
What do all these examples have in common? What these
examples all share is that the rights that are mentioned
(the rights of the King of England, the rights of a physi-
cian, and the right to drink and vote) are such that it is suf-
ficient that one meet an actual condition (of being a king,
a physician, or an adult) in order to attain the correspond-
ing right and also that it is necessary that one meet this condi-
tion. That is, it is necessary that one actually be the King of
England in order to have the rights of the King of England,
which is why neither Charles nor William possesses these
rights currently. It is necessary that one be a physician in
order to have the rights of a physician (which is why
potential physicians do not have these rights, no matter
how close to graduation they are). In our society, it is nec-
essary that one be an actual adult in order to have the right
to vote and drink alcoholic beverages. This is the reason
why potential does not count it in these examples. If it is
necessary to actually have a certain property in order to
have a certain right, then it follows, of course, that poten-
tially having this property cannot bestow that right upon
an individual, for the individual simply does not meet the
necessary requirement. Singer assumes that being a per-
son is sufficient and necessary in order to have a moral
right to life, and so he concludes that the pro-potentialist
is mistaken if she thinks that having the potential to be a
person can secure such a right. And Singer is correct, if it
were also the case that being an actual person is a neces-
sary condition for being accorded a moral right to life.
But I suspect that this is exactly what the pro-potentialist
would (and should) contest. The pro-potentialist can
agree that there are indeed cases where potential Xs are
not to be treated as actual Xs solely in virtue of their
potential, but she can also argue that this rule is not cate-
gorical. When it comes to the right to life, the pro-poten-
tialist ought to question a much more fundamental
assumption that is implicit in the anti-potentialist's argu-
ment: Why should being an actual person be a necessary
condition for possessing a right to life? Singer's reasoning
for this is unsatisfactory. He argues that self-conscious-Page 4 of 16
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necessary in order to be able to conceive of oneself as a
distinct entity that exists over time, which in turn allows
one to have the capacity for the requisite desire in order to
possess a moral right to life: the desire for continued exist-
ence. In other words, Singer argues, pace Michael Tooley,
that one must be capable of desiring continued existence
in order to have an interest in, and thus a moral right to,
continued existence [13]. I will illustrate the flaws of this
argument below, but suffice it to say, for now, that the
pro-potentialist should be wary of accepting this argu-
ment for why being a person is a necessary condition for
possessing a moral right to life.
Perhaps, the pro-potentialist may argue, there are certain
reasons why we bestow the right to life upon an actual
person that may also apply to a potential person (and
indeed there are, as I will argue below), thereby under-
mining the anti-potentialist's implicit assumption that it
is necessary that one be an actual person in order to have
a right to life. In other words, the pro-potentialist can
agree that it is indeed true that potential Xs cannot have
the same rights as actual Xs providing that it is also the case
that it is necessary that one be an actual X in order to have those
rights. However, the pro-potentialist can simply reject the
thesis that it is necessary that one be a person in order to
have a right to life (although being a person is certainly
sufficient for such a right) and argue, instead, that the
fetus' potential somehow suffices to extend to it a right to
life [14]. Singer's and Boonin's examples will not con-
vince the pro-potentialist that a fetus lacks a moral right to
life because they are assuming a crucial premise that the
pro-potentialist already rejects, if only tacitly.
When potential is morally relevant
The task that the pro-potentialist now faces is to explain
why the fetus' potential is a morally relevant characteristic
that justifies extending to it a right to life. I believe that
this can be done. What I want to do now is refute Paul Bas-
sen's point that " [n]owhere outside the abortion debate
itself is there a precedent for supposing that future pros-
pects can create a present sake [15]" by discussing exam-
ples that seems to run contrary to this assertion.
The moral right to health insurance
Despite the rising costs and ailing benefits in our health
care system, many would agree that all human beings, no
matter how young, how old, or how sick, have a moral
right to health insurance and the guarantee of health care.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights upholds this
right in Article 25:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services... [16]
In our society, then, most would maintain that currently
ill individuals have a moral right to health insurance
because having such insurance constitutes a great benefit
for them and depriving an ill individual of medical insur-
ance constitutes a harm. To deprive actually ill individuals
of health insurance would make it increasingly difficult
for them to get the treatment they need to alleviate their
illness. In a society such as ours that seeks to protect the
well-being of its citizens, the right to health insurance and
subsequent medical care is certainly vital in order to
achieve such protection.
In addition, potentially ill individuals, like my child or
myself, also have a moral right to health insurance. But
why do we accord this latter group health insurance, even
though they are not actually sick? Because possessing
health insurance, even in the absence of an impending ill-
ness, also constitutes a great benefit for potentially sick
people and a deprivation of health insurance also consti-
tutes a harm for potentially sick people.
Both actually sick people and potentially sick people pos-
sess what Joel Feinberg would call a "welfare interest" in
continued health. Welfare interests are very basic or foun-
dational interests; interests which, if thwarted, can result
in an entire collapse of one's whole matrix of interests.
Without continued health, the ability one has to fulfill
other interests in life will be compromised. While I have
an interest in continuing to work, raising my children, and
taking care of my home, I would fail to realize any of these
interests if my interested in health were thwarted. As Fein-
berg notes: " [a]ll the money in the world won't help you
if you have a fatal disease... [17]." Welfare interests, which
includes the interest in continued health, are "the very
most important interests a person has, and cry out for pro-
tection, for without their fulfillment, a person is lost... an
invasion of a welfare interest is the most serious... harm a
person can sustain [18]."
Although a discussion concerning the exact purpose and
nature of moral rights is beyond the scope of this paper, it
suffices to say that one function of moral (and legal)
rights is to protect people's interests, especially the very
important and foundational ones. Actually sick individu-
als have a moral right to health insurance because it rea-
sonably guarantees health care, and this, in turn, helps to
protect their welfare interest in continued health. This is
also what having health insurance provides for potentially
sick individuals. Possessing health insurance gives poten-
tially sick people peace of mind and a guarantee that
when they do actually get sick medical treatment will be
available for them. For consider what would occur ifPage 5 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:7 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/7potentially ill people had to wait until they were actually
sick to start the process of obtaining health insurance. By
the time all the paperwork is completed and the monetary
costs of premiums have exchanged hands, the illness will
have probably taken a turn for the worst, and this, of
course, would impede their respective welfare interest in
continued health. So the very fact that people are poten-
tially sick is a sufficient reason to extend health coverage
to them now, even though there is no actual illness
impending. Of course, a potentially ill person does not
have the moral right to actual medical treatment while she
is just potentially sick; she has this particular moral right
only when she becomes actually sick. This is because
being actually sick is a necessary condition to receiving
actual medical care, since medical care does not serve any
beneficial role to someone who is only potentially sick
and a deprivation of medical care would not harm some-
one who is only potentially sick, only to those that are
actually sick (e.g., there is no point in a doctor wrapping
my arm in a cast if it is not broken in the first place). What
a potentially sick person has a moral right to, even in her
healthy state, is the guarantee that when she does become
ill, health care will follow, and this is precisely what
health insurance provides for the potentially sick person.
The welfare interest in continued health seems to be a
wholly objective interest, rather than a subjectively medi-
ated one. By this I mean that it is not necessary that a per-
son actually desire continued health, or even possess the
capacity to desire continued health, in order to possess an
interest in it. An infant with a heart defect, for example,
surely has an interest in a life-saving operation to repair
her ailment, even though the infant lacks the cognitive
capacities necessary to be capable of desiring the opera-
tion. While an infant cannot take an interest in her contin-
ued health (i.e., she is incapable of desiring her continued
good health, since she lacks the capacity to even under-
stand what "health" means), she surely has an interest in
her continued health. It is because we recognize the
importance of preserving the well-being of members in
society, even if they are too rudimentary in their capacities
to actually take an active interest in their health, that we
extend a moral right to health care to the actually sick and
the potentially sick. Whether one possesses the actual
property of being sick, or whether one merely potentially
possess that property, having a moral right to health insur-
ance helps to secure one's important welfare interest in
continued health, which, in turn, helps the development
and well-being of members of our moral community in a
variety of ways.
The moral right to an education
As a professor, I am exposed every day to the effects of sub-
par education, especially when it comes time for students
to turn in papers and their poor writing abilities become
painfully apparent. This illustrates that being deprived of
a good education works against the interest of a person.
Thus, all actually rational agents have the moral right to a
decent education because such an education hones their
rational abilities and enriches their mind. To deprive a
rational agent of an education constitutes a harm for her,
since it deprives her of the opportunity to cultivate her
rational faculties. To provide a rational agent a decent
education, of course, constitutes a great benefit.
A very young, not fully rational, child, also has a moral
right to a decent education even though she is not cur-
rently the rational agent she will become in the future. In
fact, young children rarely practice many of the subjects
that are taught to them at their young age, rather they
come to exercise such knowledge sometime later in life. As
R.J. Gerber puts it, "the careful education tendered to the
young in our society suggests that we do, in fact, prize
human potential for what it may actually receive in the
distant future [19]." For example, there is very little a child
of ten can do with her knowledge concerning long divi-
sion or multiple digit multiplication (indeed, they are
keen enough to pick this up to a certain extent when they
cry: "When will I ever use this in real life?"). If pressed,
neither parents nor teachers may think that the child is
deriving such benefits from these facets of education cur-
rently. Rather, it is the child's potential as a future rational
being that grounds her current interests in learning more
complex mathematics. Therefore, it is indeed a good thing
to allocate to her, indeed to all children, a moral right to
a decent education, even though the fruits of such an edu-
cation may not make themselves manifest until much
later; to not do so runs the risk of impeding the child's
capacities as a rational agent and thus stifles her well-
being.
The interest in a good education may not be as founda-
tional as the interest in continued health (for many peo-
ple do live their lives and pursue other interests even in
absence of a good education), but it is a very important
interest nevertheless, and it is an interest that, also, is
wholly objective rather than subjectively meditated. That
is, even if a young child begs and screams not to go to
school (as I often did as a child), we do not thereby con-
clude that she has forfeited her moral right to an educa-
tion. Furthermore, an autistic child, or a child afflicted
with Down syndrome, may not have an actual desire for
an education and may even, because of limited cognitive
capacities, wholly lack the capacity to possess such a
desire. Yet if that education helps her advance her limited
abilities so that she may become reasonably self-sufficient
in the future, then she does have an interest in the type of
education that would benefit her even if she cannot take
an interest in it. This all illustrates, again, that the interestPage 6 of 16
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than a subjective, interest.
Consider the current market for educational infant toys.
Many parents shower their children with educational toys
from infancy (the Baby Einstein and Leap Frog collections
attest to the fact that there is a viable market in this area),
given the parents' desire to cultivate and nurture their
child's innate rational abilities from early life. Even the
best possible pet owners, in contrast, do not expose their
cats or dogs to such educational toys simply because these
nonhuman animals lack the potential to achieve a
rational mind and so the animals would derive absolutely
no benefit from this exposure in any way. This is why, I
suspect, there are no Baby Einstein or Leap Frog collec-
tions for puppies or kittens. This certainly attests to the
fact that we treat beings with certain potentials (e.g. the
potential for rational agency or autonomy) differently
than we treat beings that lack such potential. As L.W. Sum-
ner notes:
It is not astonishing that someone who values ration-
ality should care for creatures who will be rational in
the future as well as those who are rational at present.
Protecting the lives of the potentially and actually
rational are merely two different means of promoting
rationality [20].
Other instances when potential matters
To depart from the subject of rights briefly, consider moral
education. We teach our very young children to say
"please" and "thank you," to share their toys, to say that
they are sorry when they have done something wrong.
When we ask this of a two-year-old now, we do not do so
because she is receiving current benefits from such moral
education. A two-year-old will probably not learn an
immediate lesson about the importance of sharing or
politeness when we make her share her toys or express
gratitude, rather we do so because of her potential as a
future moral agent, and her potential in this area certainly
affects how we treat her now. Indeed, if one sides with Aris-
totle on this matter, it is imperative that we bestow moral
education upon our children from a very early age, even
though they may not be current moral agents, because this
will make a crucial difference towards their becoming vir-
tuous individuals in the future: "It is not unimportant,
then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right from
our youth; rather, it is very important; indeed, all-impor-
tant [21]." That is, a child's potential to become a moral
agent grounds a present interest in being exposed to moral
education.
Finally, consider a young child that displays a keen ability
to play a musical instrument. Her music teacher tells you,
her parent, that she has the potential, if that potential is
cultivated, to become a fantastic pianist or violinist. Her
potential to be a great musician creates a current interest
in being given the best music lessons that are within your
financial means to acquire. If the child is deprived of such
lessons, and as a result never cultivates or realizes her
potential, then it can be said, quite rightly, that the child
has been harmed, and that she would have greatly bene-
fited had she received those lessons. The child's potential
grounds a current interest in music lessons, and her poten-
tial also grounds the extent that she is harmed if she is
deprived of those lessons (i.e., if her potential to become
a phenomenal musician was great, then she was more
harmed by being deprived of those lessons in comparison
to some other child who had very little, if any, potential
in the area of music).
The point of these examples is to illustrate that Bassen was
simply incorrect when he claims that future prospects do
not create a present sake, for all of the above examples
indicate otherwise. A being's potential can certainly play a
pivotal role in deciding how she should be treated or,
more precisely for the topic at hand, what moral rights
should be allocated to her. While it is true that a potential
X cannot be given the rights of an actual X in certain
instances (when being an actual X is a necessary condition
in order to have specific rights), this is not a universal rule,
as the above examples illustrate. Potentially possessing a
property may be sufficient for entailing an interest in
some moral right if possessing that moral right constitutes
a benefit for the individual that potentially possesses that
property and a denial of that moral right constitutes a
harm (e.g., it is not necessary that one actually be sick in
order to possess a right to health insurance; potentially
possessing the property of being sick is sufficient for
entailing a moral right to health insurance, since possess-
ing this right constitutes a benefit, and its denial consti-
tutes a harm, for the potentially sick as well as for the
actually sick). From this we can arrive at the following
generalization:
The moral relevancy of potential principle
A potential X may be granted the same moral rights as an
actual X in virtue of its potential if its potential generates
an interest in such a moral right; that is, if possessing the
moral right constitutes a benefit for the potential X and a denial
of the moral right constitutes a harm.
It is important to stress the caveat that the potential X
must both benefit from the extension of the right of an
actual X and also be harmed by its denial. This is because
someone may argue that extending the rights of an actual
king onto a potential king may indeed benefit him, for I
am sure both Charles and William would benefit from the
rights and benefits the current queen possesses. Potential
physicians, medical students, would certainly benefitPage 7 of 16
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may argue that this is sufficient grounds for extending the
rights of actual physicians onto them. But in these exam-
ples, the potential Xs would not be harmed by a denial of
these rights, and so there is no pressing need to accord
them these rights why they are still in their potential state.
This is not the case for the examples I mention that do
warrant extending the rights of actual Xs onto potential
Xs. In these cases, a subsequent harm would befall the
potential Xs if denied the rights of actual Xs while still in
a potential state. The same goes for a right to life. As I will
argue below, not only is extending such the right to life
onto a potential person a benefit to him, but its depriva-
tion is also a very grave harm, as it would be for an actual
person.
Moral rights (and legal rights as well) exist for the very pur-
pose of protecting the well-being and welfare of individu-
als. While I certainly do not have a moral right to anything
whatsoever that is in my interests (e.g., I may have an
interest in obtaining the money in your wallet, but this
does not grant me a moral right to the money in your wal-
let), moral rights are there to, at the very least, protect our
very important welfare interests, the interests that would
result in a serious harm if violated. Of course, the respec-
tive interests in continued health and continued existence
are two of the most important welfare interests there are,
and so it can be argued that our moral right to health care
and our moral right to life are grounded upon the premise
that these integral welfare interests are to be protected as
much as possible for all the members of our moral com-
munity. If possessing a potential property can make a
being a proper subject of harm in virtue of that potential,
then this should suffice to extend to her a moral right that
would protect her interest in not being harmed and helps
to ensure her welfare.
The interest in continued existence is quite possibility the
most important welfare interest any individual possesses.
As Feinberg writes:
Indeed, there is nothing a normal person... dreads
more than his own death, and that dread, in the vast
majority of cases, is as rational as it is unavoidable, for
unless we continue alive, we have no chance whatever
of achieving those goals that are the ground of out ulti-
mate interest [22].
Contra Singer, there seems to be no reason to hold that
only actual persons have an interest in continued exist-
ence. Singer argues that one must possess the capacity to
desire continued existence in order to have an interest in
it. Not only does this render fetuses incapable of possess-
ing this interest, it renders infants and very young children
(e.g., toddlers) incapable as well, since they too lack the
conceptual capacity necessary to desire continued exist-
ence (and Singer is infamous for his argument that,
because of this reason, there is nothing intrinsically mor-
ally impermissible about infanticide).
Certainly, however, this flies in the face of commonsense.
Most of us hold that infants and young toddlers certainly
do have a welfare interest in continued existence, despite
their lack of personhood and therefore their inability to
desire continued existence. That is, many of us hold that
the interest in continued existence is a wholly objective,
rather than a subjective, welfare interest. A terminally ill
infant, for example, certainly possesses a welfare interest
in continued existence, which in turn grounds a prima
facie moral right to procure a life-saving operation. It
would be dubious, to say the least, to argue that it is per-
missible to let an infant die, when her defect can be easily
repaired, on the grounds that she has no interest in the
operation or her continued existence because she is utterly
incapable of desiring it. As Stone puts it: " [a]n infant need
not desire a welfare to have one [23]."
Yet I submit that the reason they have such an interest is
strictly in virtue of their potential to become persons. If an
infant was afflicted with some horrible defect that ren-
dered her incapable of ever growing past the mental age of
a few months old, many would hold that her interest in
continued existence would vanquish, or at least would be
rendered so weak it would almost be negligible. This is so
because death would not harm her as much, if at all, when
she has no hopes of ever mentally evolving past a few
months old; we would be depriving her of very little by
allowing her death, whereas we would be depriving a
healthy infant of much more if we killed her, given the
enriching life typical to persons. The welfare interest in
continued existence is wholly objective rather than subjec-
tive, but when it comes to nonpersons, such as infants and
young toddlers, their welfare interest in continued exist-
ence is based on their potential to become persons and
live the rewarding life common to persons. The fact that
we usually regard the killing of healthy infants as murder,
and the fact that we seem to have no moral qualms or
objections against bestowing medical treatment upon
infants so that they can continue living their lives and real-
izing their potential, illustrates that potential does matter.
At least when it comes to infants, their potential to
become persons certainly influences their current welfare
interest in continued existence, which, in turn, grounds an
interest in medical care and leads to the moral (and legal)
judgment of infanticide as a form of murder. (There does
seem to be a problem with this claim when we consider
whether or not a mentally disabled infant, who will never
really grow to have the robust mental capacities of a per-
son, has an interest in continued existence. My claim does
seem to, prima facie, entail that they lack such an interest,Page 8 of 16
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disabled individuals who are not persons, nevertheless,
may experience a life of subjective, although perhaps rudi-
mentary, pleasures. The best response I have for this prob-
lem, at the moment, is the following. It is the case that
mental disabilities come in degrees, and some individuals
with mental disabilities approximate personhood more
than others. The strength of the interest in continued
existence that a disabled infant possesses may run parallel
to how closely she can approximate personhood in the
future. As abovementioned, if she has a disease that ren-
dered her unable to ever surpass the mental age of a few
months old, her interest in continued existence would
seem to be much weaker than the interest in continued
existence that a healthy infant possesses. Here, I can
appeal to Marquis and his "future-like-ours" view. Per-
haps an interest in continued existence is only as strong as
how much an infant's future is "like ours", i.e., like a per-
son's. I do want to point out, however, that if we do want
to argue that even rudimentary subjective pleasures is suf-
ficient to establish some robust interest in continued
existence, we should be willing to grant this interest to all
nonhuman animals who experience rudimentary subjec-
tive pleasures, lest we concede to speciesism).
Thus, potential can be relevant when it comes to ascribing
present interests to some beings in some situations. We
can now re-state the pro-potentialist's argument as fol-
lows.
Premise 1: All innocent persons have a moral right to life.
Premise 2: Since all innocent persons have a moral right
to life, all potential innocent persons also have a moral
right to life.
[Justification for premise 2: A moral right to life would con-
stitute a benefit for a potential person as well as for an
actual person, and its denial would constitute a harm for
a potential person as well as for an actual person].
Premise 3: The fetus is a potential innocent person.
Conclusion: The fetus has a moral right to life.
This is the justification I believe a pro-potentialist ought
to give in defense of premise two. The pro-potentialist can
argue that the anti-potentialist's rejection of premise two
is a result of his tacit assumption that only actual persons
can qualify as bearers of a moral right to life; a claim that
the pro-potentialist rejects. As the above examples are
meant to illustrate, it seems perfectly justified to treat a
potential X as an actual X if the potential X has an interest
in such treatment; if doing so constitutes a benefit for the
being in question and a denial of that treatment consti-
tutes a harm. It is my potential to become sick that
grounds my current interest, and my moral right, to health
insurance even though I am not actually sick; it is a young
child's potential to become a rational and moral agent
that grounds her current interest in academic and moral
education, even though she may not currently be a
rational or a moral agent. In all these instances, the poten-
tial being possesses some sort of current or actual interest
in virtue of her potential, and thus a moral right can be
properly be bestowed upon her, in virtue of her potential,
in order to protect that interest and, in turn, her well-
being and welfare.
So, we have seen that, at times, potential matters and that
at other times it does not matter. Does potential matter
when it comes to how we ought to treat or regard the
human fetus? I think that an argument in the affirmative
has best been made by Jim Stone in his articles "Why
Potentiality Matters" (1987) and "Why Potentiality Still
Matters" (1994). Stone argues that the human embryo or
fetus is a being that is intrinsically determined, due to its
biological nature, to become a being whose life contains a
set of great conscious goods. That is, the embryo's biolog-
ical nature as a member of the species Homo sapiens is of
the type that contains its own causal powers that leads to,
as Stone puts it, the embryo "mak [ing] itself self-aware
[24]." Because the embryo's biological nature is "suffi-
cient to realize self-awareness, social interaction, and the
possibility of moral stature," this alone grounds the
embryo's claim to "care and protection [25]." Stone's
main premise in his argument is that
[a]nything benefits from having the good which it is
its nature to make for itself. I submit that we have a
prima facie duty to creatures not to deprive them of
the conscious goods which it is in their nature to real-
ize [26].
Because the embryo or fetus has a biological nature that,
if left to its natural progression, will result in a great good
for the embryo or fetus, there is a basis for grounding an
interest in continued existence to the embryo or fetus; the
embryo or fetus has an interest in continuing to function
and realizing its biological nature, a nature that typically
brings with it a set of conscious goods that are valuable to
possess.
If Stone is right, then the human embryo or fetus pos-
sesses a welfare interest in continued existence because its
potential as a future person tells us something about what
the embryo or fetus is now. A fetus' potential is a marker of
what it is in its biological nature to achieve, and this, in
turn, grounds a welfare interest in continuing life so that
it may achieve these conscious goods. Thus, a fetus' poten-
tial informs us about what type of future it has now, andPage 9 of 16
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to achieve the conscious goods that it is part of its nature
to achieve. As Stone writes:
... if the developmental path determined by the crea-
ture's genetic constitution leads to a conscious good
for her the creature has an actual interest in growing
up. It is true for her at t that growing up is a benefit and
not growing up is a harm. A creature's present interests
are relevant to her rights; therefore potentiality matters
[27].
Thus, the fetus' potential can play an important role in the
abortion debate. The fetus' potential to become a person
indicates what type of future life it will come to possess if
allowed to grow up, and this, in turn, grounds a current
interest in continued existence so that the fetus may real-
ize that future. This interest that may be protected by
extending to the fetus at least a prima facie moral right to
life.
I can foresee two possible objections to my argument, the
second of which can serve to segue into the next section of
the paper. The first objection is the following. Perhaps I
should view my obligation to give my child a good aca-
demic and moral education as an obligation to the adult
the child will become, rather than to the child at her
present state. That is, if I deprive my child of an education
now there will be a future person, my child qua adult, who
will be substantially worse off than she would have been
had I given her a proper education. Similarly, if I deprive
my gifted child of music lessons now, the real victim is not
the current child, but rather the adult the child will
become who was deprived of the opportunity to become
a wonderful musician. Thus, my offspring's potential does
not serve to render her qua child a victim, but rather her
qua adult a victim if her potential is not realized. Poten-
tial, therefore, does not ground any current interests at all.
By the same token, the fetus' potential for personhood
does not ground any current interest for the fetus. The real
subject of harm is the future person, who does not actu-
ally come into existence if the fetus is aborted.
This leads to the second objection. I can harm the future
person that the fetus becomes if I do something now
against the fetus, for example, I can administer to a preg-
nant woman a drug that would result in the fetus' eyes not
developing correctly, thereby blinding the future person
that develops from the fetus. That is, once the fetus is born
there is an individual (the subsequent infant, child, and
adult) who is substantially worse off than she otherwise
would have been had the development of her eyes not
been interfered with while in the fetal stage. But notice,
the objection continues, that this is not what happens
when we are talking about abortion. If a fetus is aborted,
what we are doing is preventing the existence of a future
person rather than partaking in a current action that will
result in a harm for a future person. Thus, when we abort
the fetus, we are really harming no currently existing being
and we are doing nothing but preventing the existence of
a future being. Whereas if we thwart the development of a
fetus' eyes, we are, thereby, truly harming someone: the
future person that will be blinded as a result, granting that
the fetus is allowed to be born and grow up.
The upshot of these two objections is essentially the fol-
lowing: the reason I have to worry about bestowing
proper education or medical insurance upon my child in
virtue of her potential is because there will be a future
being that would be a victim of that deprivation. How-
ever, no such future victim exists if the fetus is killed. So,
potential matters in the first set of cases I have described
because we are dealing with the welfare of a future indi-
vidual that will suffer as a result of the current child's dep-
rivation. But if I kill a fetus now and stop it from realizing
its potential, then there will be no such individual that
will be harmed in the future.
Although the two objections are related, I will discuss each
one of them distinctly in turn. When it comes to the first
objection, which holds that my obligations are really to
my offspring qua adult rather than my offspring qua child,
and thus potential really does not ground current interests
after all, I offer the following two responses. First, once a
being exists that can be identified with a future being that
experiences conscious goods in her future, then realizing
that future is in the current being's interest, and not just in
the interest of the future being she will become, because
that future does not belong to some random other; rather
that future is her future, and a being has an interest in real-
izing a future that is full of great conscious goods for her.
Indeed she has a welfare interest in such a future, for with-
out being allowed the opportunity to live out her life, any
other possible interest she may possess is thwarted. The
adult human person and the infant or child from whom
she emerged is the same individual and thus, it makes little
sense to discuss them as if they were two separate entities.
As Michael Lockwood puts it: "the infant that [I] once was
had, I want to say, a strong prospective interest in develop-
ing further, seeing that the kind of life [I have enjoyed]
constitutes a great benefit, and that the infant and later
[me] are one and the same individual [28]."
Second, even if I grant that the proper subject of my moral
obligation is to my offspring qua adult, rather than to my
offspring qua child, this really makes no practical differ-
ence in how I treat my child who is currently at a young
stage because, again, they are the same individual; they share
an identity relation, and therefore I could not fulfill my
obligation to my adult offspring without, in a sense,Page 10 of 16
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tion to my adult offspring to ensure that she is an edu-
cated person, I cannot fulfill this obligation without
educating her as a child. If I have a moral obligation to
ensure that my offspring grows into adulthood so that she
can experience a valuable life, then I cannot fulfill this
obligation without ensuring that her welfare interest in
continued existence is respected throughout all the stages
of her life.
The second objection can be read in two ways. If the fetus
is not yet identical to any future person, if there is no iden-
tity relation between the currently existing fetus and some
future person, then it is true that all abortion does is
deprive a possible person from coming into existence
rather than harming a currently existing individual.
Unless one wants to declare contraception or abstinence
prima facie morally wrong, however, it must be conceded
that there is no obligation to bring possible people into
existence. Yet, if the fetus shares an identity relation with
a future person so that the person's life constitutes the
fetus' future, then the objection is not at all effective. It
would be tantamount to arguing that it is morally imper-
missible to harm a future person by inflicting a current
damage that will affect her in her future state (e.g., blind-
ing a fetus so that the future person will suffer from blind-
ness), but that harm can be circumvented by ridding the
world of the being altogether; a being that already exists, an
actual being, who would grow up to experience all the
conscious goods common to the life of persons. If this is
correct, however, then I am hard-pressed to find any rea-
son why killing a being would ever constitute a moral
harm against it, unless we reduce the moral harm of kill-
ing a person to simply thwarting her desire for continued
existence, which would render the interest in continued
existence a subjective, rather than objective, interest. It cer-
tainly seems dubious to argue that we can evade the future
victimization of a being by killing the being now, an indi-
vidual that actually exists and who's future you are taking
away, so he will not exist in the future when harm may
have taken place. I do not evade the moral wrongness of
blinding my baby by killing her so that she will not have
to suffer from being blind. If anything, I do nothing but
add much insult to injury
But notice that the whole discussion demands that we
antecedently answer the question of personal identity. If
the fetus is nothing more than the material precursor to an
actual human life, so that there is really no identity rela-
tion between the currently existing fetus and a future per-
son, then abortion would be tantamount to birth control
in the sense that it only prevents the existence of an indi-
vidual. However, if one thinks that the fetus already is the
same individual as the future person, then killing the fetus
is not preventing the existence of anyone, it is, rather, kill-
ing someone that already exists and as such is tantamount
to killing an infant or a young child who would have, if
not killed, grown into a person. For example, because
Sumner holds that the attainment of sentience is such a
pivotal threshold for a fetus to cross, he argues that
[e]arly (prethreshold) abortions share the former cate-
gory with the use of contraceptives, whereas late (post-
threshold) abortions share the latter category with
infanticide and other forms of homicide... after the
[fetus crosses the] threshold [of sentience] there is
such a creature, and its normal future is rich and full
of life. To lose that life is to sustain an enormous loss
[29].
For Sumner, human life begins to exist in all relevant
ways, in a way that grants what he calls "moral standing"
to the fetus, upon the acquisition of the capacity for sen-
tience and consciousness. It is at this point, then, that
potential begins to matter for Sumner, for now there is a
being with moral standing that stands to gain from that
potential developing and concurrently stands to lose from
that potential being frustrated. Before then, however,
there is no such being; all that exists before then is a
merely possible being, according to Sumner.
I will take it as a given that we are under no moral obliga-
tion to respect the interests of only possible people simply
because possible people can, at best, have only possible
interests. If an individual life has not yet come into exist-
ence, if it is only a possible being, then we cannot speak
of respecting actual interests. Therefore, we cannot address
the issue of the moral importance of fetal potential until
we first address the issue of personal identity. That is, we
must first determine when a being begins to exist who is
identical to a future person, thereby making it the case
that the current individual possesses an actual welfare
interest in not being killed so that she can realize her
potential to become that person.
When does fetal potential become morally relevant?
The necessity of addressing the issue of personal identity
Potential certainly seems to matter, and it certainly seems
to matter when it comes to the human fetus if one thinks
that the fetus is a being that is identical to a future being
who will experience the conscious goods typical to per-
sons and thus has an interest in realizing those goods.
Does this mean that my argument leads to a rather con-
servative position against abortion? It may or it may not;
this question cannot really be answered until we first
address the question of personal identity. In other words,
the answer to this very complex practical moral problem
has its roots in the intricate metaphysical issue of when a
being's identity begins to exist. Jim Stone captures thisPage 11 of 16
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creature's moral right to life begins when he does [30]."
When does potential matter? I would like to adopt
Michael Lockwood's claim that " [a] potential for X gener-
ates an interest only where there is some individual for
whom the development of the potential for X constitutes
a benefit [31]." That is, in order to meaningfully discuss
the benefits of realizing a being's potential, the being in
question must be more than a purely possible being, since
possible beings can, at most, have only potential interests
and not actual ones. That is, the being must actually exist
in order to possess a current and actual interest in realizing
that potential (this does not mean that the being must
exist right now in order to have some sort of interest. As
Lockwood argues, the actual existence of this being can be
understood in a tenseless fashion, a being that exists at
any time, either past, present or future. If we know that a
being is going to certainly exist in the future, then we can
certainly thwart its interests now by doing something that
will be detrimental for him in the future) [32].
One reason why it is so important to stress that potential
only begins to matter when there is a being in existence of
whom the realizing of that potential would constitute a
benefit is because doing so allows a response to the
sperm/ova problem. Although both a sperm and an ovum
each possesses some potential, if united, to produce a
being who will grow up to become a person, neither of
them possess the potential on their own. At conception,
the sperm and the ovum lose their own numerical identity
and together give rise to a wholly new being: a being that
possesses the genetic constitution of the sperm and the
genetic constitution of the ovum, but is not identical to
either. Gametes produce a new being, but neither of them,
themselves, are this new being and so the being who
would come to benefit from the realization of potential
does not exist before the gametes unite. Don Marquis, for
example, argues that before conception takes place, there
does not yet exist a subject to whom we can attribute a val-
uable future. Gametes themselves do not possess a valua-
ble future because they cease to exist upon fusion and a
new ontologically distinct being, the zygote, begins to
exist.
Prior to conception there is no individual that is the
same individual as the later human being that has, or
would have had, a valuable life. Individual identity
does not survive fusion or fission, whether contracep-
tion, amoeba reproduction, or brain bisection are the
examples [33].
Stone also holds to a similar view.
The sperm and the egg cannot both be identical to the
adult human being, nor can that creature be identical
to the adult human being, nor can that creature be
identical to just one of them... [b]oth the sperm and
the egg can produce something which has the poten-
tial of becoming an adult human being, but neither
the sperm nor the egg has that potential itself [34].
The kind of potential harbored by gametes to become per-
sons is of a different type than the potential harbored by
infants, children, and perhaps even fetuses. In order to
more clearly distinguish between these two different types
of potential, Stone denotes them differently. There is what
he calls "strong potential," which is identity preserving
potential. If A has the strong potential to become B, then
"A will produce B if A develops normally and the B so pro-
duced will be such that it was once A [35]." Then there is
what he calls "weak potential," which is non-identity pre-
serving potential. To say that A has the weak potential to
become B is to say that A can help in the production of B,
but A itself will not become B. That is, A is "an element in
a causal condition that produces B and, further, the matter
of A will be (or will at least help produce) the matter of the
B [36]." A child, for example, has the strong potential to
become an adult person because the adult and the child
are the same individual; they have an identity relation.
Gametes, on the other hand, have only the weak potential
to become an adult person because their respective matter
will help produce the future adult, but neither of them is
already the individual that will become that adult. There
is no identity relation between an adult person and the
gametes that produced her, if for no other reason than
because they are numerically different: gametes are two
distinct beings in their own right while the adult human
is a single distinct being.
It is strong potential that matters when it comes to this
issue. Since a child has the strong potential to become an
adult, that adult's life already forms part of the child's cur-
rent interests in growing up, since it his future that we are
talking about. Gametes, however, do not possess an iden-
tity relation with that future being and so the best we can
do is discuss the possible interests of the possible individual
that may come into fruitarian if the gametes unite. There is
no actual interest yet because there is no actual subject yet,
and thus no subject of whom the realization of potential
would constitute a benefit. Once an individual begins to
exist that is the same individual as a later being, then we
can meaningfully say that there is an individual currently
in existence that would benefit from being allowed to
develop that potential. When all we have are gametes,
there is no subject yet in existence that would benefit from
being allowed to grow up, and, therefore, there is no such
victim yet that is being deprived of that opportunity. As
Stone writes:Page 12 of 16
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would have otherwise have realized for herself. The
sperm and the egg, on the other hand, can never have
these properties even though they can produce some-
thing which can. If we kill them there is no good of
which they are deprived [37].
So when does there begin to exist a subject that is identical
to a future being, so that realizing that future being's life
grounds a current interest in that subject growing up? The
answer to this question will determine when strong
potential begins to exist and thus when there is a current
actual interest in continued existence. I will not endorse
any one view of personal identity here, since defending
one view is a long and complex thesis in its own right, and
would take us beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
what I will do is offer a brief survey of three accounts of
personal identity in order to illustrate how pivotal the
question is before we can find the proper place of poten-
tial when it comes to attributing to a fetus a welfare inter-
est in continued existence.
Animalism
Animalism is the philosophical view of personal identity,
famously defended by Eric Olson [38], that states that
people continue to exist over time so long as their numer-
ically distinct organism continues to exist. According to
this theory, you are essentially a human animal, you per-
sist as long as your organism does, and you come into
existence whenever your numerically distinct organism
comes into existence. According to some philosophers,
however, this does not occur until approximately fourteen
days post-fertilization, when the cells in the zygote no
longer divide into identical daughter cells, and when mul-
tiple ontologically distinct zygotes can no longer emerge
(which is how multiple births come to be). For example,
philosopher and theologian Normal Ford argues that "it
would be hard to admit the presence of an individual
human being in the zygote if, in principle, it could lose its
ontological identity whenever twinning occurs in the
course of development [39]." Furthermore, Karen Daw-
son writes:
... the individual created at fertilization may not
remain the same throughout life. The simplest dem-
onstration of this is identical twinning which is possi-
ble for about 12 days after fertilization. In this process
the original zygote ceases to exist. Conversely, during
this time it is also possible for two zygotes derived
from the independent fertilization of two eggs to fuse
forming a chimera – the one individual resulting from
two fertilization events [40].
According to Animalsim, then, we begin to exist not when
our unique genetic code comes into existence, not at con-
ception, but rather when our numerically distinct organ-
ism begins to exist, at approximately fourteen days post-
fertilization, when division is no longer possible and thus
where is there irreversible biological identity. After this
time, however, we have a distinct human animal that is
identical to a future human animal that will live the type
of life common to persons. Thus, according to Animalism,
human identity begins rather early in pregnancy. Coupled
with the ethical considerations of potential outlined
above, such a view of personal identity may lead to a
rather conservative view on abortion because there is an
identity relation between what is now an embryo (the fer-
tilized egg after two weeks), and the subsequent person
the embryo will become in virtue of the fact that they are
the same human animal. According to someone who
holds to Animalism, the embryo has the strong potential
to become that adult, and thus the embryo, and the sub-
sequent fetus, can be properly ascribed an interest in con-
tinued existence (I want to emphasize the term "may"
because it is still possible to maintain that the fetus has a
welfare interest in continued existence, in virtue of being
the same human animal as a future person that will live a
valuable life, but still hold that abortion is morally per-
missible. The reason for this is that it has yet to be estab-
lished whether the fetus' interest in continued existence
trumps a woman's right to bodily autonomy. This is an
entirely separate question, however, and, other than
briefly mentioning it again below, it is not an issue that I
will deal with in this paper. Moreover, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the beginning of an identity relation
with a future person entails the beginning of moral status.
For example, David DeGrazia separates the two in his
recent book Human Identity and Bioethics [41]. Although
he does endorse a version of Animalism in his book, he
does not argue that moral status begins whenever numer-
ical identity begins).
Psychological Criterion Account of personal identity
Animalism, however, is rejected by many. Some philoso-
phers argue that personal identity is intimately correlated
in some sense with possessing some sort of mental life,
although many differ as to how robust that mental life
must be in order to establish an identity relation. The view
that we are essentially persons, and thus that we comes into
existence as persons, persists as persons, and die when we
lose our personhood, is called the Psychological Criterion
Account of Personal Identity. For example, Mary Ann War-
ren argues that:
personal pronouns like "we" refer to people; we are
essentially people if we are essentially anything at all.
Therefore, if fetuses and gametes are not people, then
we were never fetuses and gametes, though one might
say that we emerged from them. The fetus which later
became you was not you because you did not exist atPage 13 of 16
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ever would have been done to you, since you would
have never existed [42].
Notice that Warren also makes the assumption that a
being must exist, in some way, before she can be the
proper subject of harm or benefit. If we were never identi-
cal to a fetus, if, in fact, we came into existence gradually
as our personhood gradually arose, then abortion would
not have harmed us because we had not yet existed in the
fetal stage. In this sense, Warren may perhaps agree with
Lockwood that the realization of potential is only morally
relevant when there exists a being of whom the realization
of that potential constitutes a benefit. But, according to
Warren, no such individual yet exists at the fetal stage
because the fetus is not identical to any future person who
experiences life. Thus, there exists no one, at the fetal
stage, who would benefit from the realization of poten-
tial. Peter Singer, who also maintains that it is necessary to
be an actual person in order to have an interest in contin-
ued existence and a moral right to it, also seems to
espouse a similar view of personal identity. He writes:
I am not the infant from whom I developed. The
infant could not look forward to developing into the
kind of being that I am, or even into any intermediate
being, between the being I now am and the infant. I
cannot even recall being the infant; there are no men-
tal links between us [43].
Singer seems to hold that in order for there to be an iden-
tity relation between the infant from whom I developed
and myself currently, the infant must have been able to
conceive of herself as a future person and must have had
the capacity to "look forward" to becoming that future
person. In other words, self-consciousness, in addition to
memory retention, seems to be a necessary condition,
according to Singer, for possessing any type of significant
mental links that could establish an identity relation. Like
Warren, therefore, Singer seems to be arguing that an
identity relation between past and future stages of a self
can only come into being once personhood arises, for
only persons possess self-consciousness in the robust
fashion that Singer believes is requisite for an identity
relation.
The plausibility of the Psychological Criterion Account is
not the subject of this paper, and so I will neither defend
nor criticize it. What is important to see, however, is the
upshot of accepting this theory when it comes to the ques-
tion of the importance of fetal potential. If we are essen-
tially persons, and thus we do not really begin to exist
until there is a person on the scene, fetuses, then, possess
only the weak potential to produce persons, i.e., their mat-
ter will contribute to the making of a future person, but
they will not become persons themselves. On this view,
then, fetuses lack identity-preserving potential. Although
Stone disagrees with the Psychological Criterion Account
himself, he succinctly sums up the consequences of hold-
ing to such a view.
Warren's view is that the being which realizes self-
awareness is a person; a person comes into being
when it realizes self-awareness; hence a person was
never a fetus or an infant. It follows that the fetus, like
the sperm, produces a numerically different entity
which is the thing that thinks and feels, so the fetus
has no welfare of its own [44].
Therefore, according to this view, potential never counts
throughout the fetal stage and no fetus ever has an interest
in continued existence. Of course, this also leads to the
conclusion that any potential that a neonate possesses is
also non-identity preserving potential, since neonates are
not persons yet. Thus, killing a neonate does not deprive
her of her future simply because she has no such future
yet, since she is not yet identical to any future person. This
would make the killing of a neonate intrinsically morally
negligible, since all we are doing is preventing a future
person from coming into existence, rather than killing an
actually existing one, which is a position that Warren her-
self admits to [45].
Embodied Mind Account of personal identity
This account of personal identity also holds that possess-
ing some sort of mental life is necessary for identity to
exist and persist over time. However, the degree of mental
complexity that is requisite is no where near the robust-
ness that the Psychological Criterion Account requires.
According to the Embodied Mind Account, a human
being begins to exists in all the ways that matter, in a way
that allows her to be identified with a future being, when
she gains the capacity for conscious awareness sometime
during fetushood (at approximately mid-gestation). Jeff
McMahan is one such defender of this view.
I suggest that the corresponding criterion for personal
identity is the continued existence and functioning, in
nonbranching form, of enough of the same brain to be
capable of generating mental activity. This criterion
stresses the survival of one's basic psychological capac-
ities, in particular the capacity for consciousness. It
does not require continuity of any particular contents
of one's mental life [46].
Michael Lockwood also seems to adhere to this theory,
although he does not refer to it by this title. Nevertheless,
he argues thatPage 14 of 16
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once again, whatever as a matter of scientific or meta-
physical fact, normally underlies these more superfi-
cial continuities and provides the deep explanation for
them; and from a purely secular standpoint I should
have thought that the overwhelming most favored
candidate was a continuity of organisation within
those parts of our brain that directly sustain those
activities we think of as mental... considerations of
identity firmly favor the view that before the brain has
matured to the point of being able to sustain psycho-
logical functions, a human life has yet to begin [47].
Advocates of this view, then, maintain that no human
identity really begins to exist until the fetus becomes capa-
ble of consciousness awareness. Before this point, the
human fetus possesses a biological life, but not a bio-
graphical one. A biographical life occurs once the fetus
becomes capable of having some sort of inner mental life,
when it becomes a locus of consciousness. Persistence of
identity does not necessitate a robust form of self-con-
sciousness or rationality, as the Psychological Criterion
Account seems to hold, but it does necessitate at least some
form of mental life, even if it is a comparatively rudimen-
tary one.
As a result of this view, the fetus' potential begins to mat-
ter in terms of attributing to it an interest in continued
existence when it becomes the type of being whose brain
can sustain the capacity for conscious awareness, for it is
here when an identity relation with a future person begins
to exist, and thus it is here when we can attribute the life
of this future person as rightfully the fetus' future. McMa-
han holds, therefore, that "just prior to twenty weeks [the
approximate gestational age when a fetus acquires the
capacity for consciousness awareness], there is no one
there to be affected by an abortion. After twenty-eight
weeks, the developed fetus is definitely present and would
be affected for the worse by an abortion [48]." Along the
same vein, Lockwood writes:
If this is right, then the potential of a human embryo
for developing into a [p]erson does not confer on it
any right to protection. For it has no brain at all. Con-
sequently, that which would stand to benefit by the
development of this potential does not yet exist [49].
What is interesting to notice is that none of the above-
mentioned philosophers really denies that potential never
matters, not even Warren who perhaps has the most lib-
eral abortion view and who also, not coincidentally I
think, pushes identity much further into biological life
than is commonsensical (most of us do think that there is
an identity relation between us as adults and our infant
self). I say this because I suspect that Warren herself would
agree with me that in the examples stated in the previous
section, potential does seem to matter and does indeed
ground interests: it is because a child is a potential moral
agent that her current moral education matters, it is
because she is a potential rational agent that her current
academic education matters. Potential does matter, but
the question is when does it begin to matter, and it is here
where disagreements arise. I fully endorse Lockwood's
view that "it is potential plus identity that morally counts
for something [50]." The disagreement arises when there
are conflicting views concerning when personal identity
begins to exist. If one thinks that personal identity consists
the persistence of the numerically single human organ-
ism, i.e., Animalism, then potential counts rather early in
gestation, while still in the embryonic stage, whenever
irreversible numerical identity is established. If one holds
to the Psychological Criterion Account, potential never
matters throughout gestation, since personal identity con-
sists in being the same person over time, and a person
comes into existence only after post-infancy. The Embod-
ied Mind Account is the middle ground, which states that
personal identity begins in mid-gestation, and therefore,
for anyone who holds this view, potential may begin to
matter only then.
Conclusion
Nothing I have said in this paper necessarily grounds a
position that abortion is always morally wrong or unjust
(which is why I keep referring as the fetal moral right to
life as a prima facie right). Even though potential can
ground an interest in continued existence for an early
embryo or mid-gestation fetus, depending on what theory
of personal identity one adheres, we still have to contend
with Thomsonian-like objections which state that a fetus'
moral right to life does not entail a woman's obligation to
sacrifice her body in order to gestate it for nine months
[51]. Nevertheless, I believe I have demonstrated why
potential does matter, and I hope to have also illustrated
that perhaps the major disagreement about this issue has
more of its roots in the metaphysical question of personal
identity that has previously been acknowledged.
Even the most basic and pervasive ethical debate, like the
abortion debate and the debate concerning the moral rel-
evancy of fetal potential, is intimately connected with
underlying metaphysical assumptions, even though these
assumptions are rarely discussed amongst applied ethi-
cists. This illustrates that the tendency to divorce "tradi-
tional" or "abstract" philosophy from "practical"
philosophy is unfortunate and misguided. In this case, we
cannot address the issue of when fetal potential becomes
morally relevant until we first address the matter of per-
sonal identity, and this is a subject that is very thorny
indeed. Although I have only given a brief synopsis of
three major views, there are many others, each as highlyPage 15 of 16
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contested by some philosophers as the next. However, by
pointing out the underlying metaphysical assumptions in
this area of applied ethics, I hope to have at least nudged
the debate further in a new and, with any luck, effective
direction.
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